CHINA PAPER LEADERS · NO.04
山鹰国际为什么强？
它真正运营的是一张循环网络
穿透亏损表象，看回收纤维、七大基地、20亿平方米包装与终端客户如何连接——以及利润为何承压、哪些调整已经发生、修复还要验证什么
一张真正有价值的循环网络，不是把“回收、造纸、包装”三个板块并排放在组织架构里，而是让终端客户产生的回收纤维重新进入原纸系统，让原纸基地与包装工厂共享订单、价格、质量和库存数据，再把物流、能源与资金周转共同压缩到更优水平。
山鹰国际最容易被看见的是规模。公司2025年年报称，国内七大造纸基地现有落地产能已达千万吨，包装板块年产量超过20亿平方米；原纸销量748.60万吨，包装销量20.97亿平方米。这样的体量当然重要，但如果只用产能和销量解释山鹰，就会错过它更难复制的部分：它同时站在废纸入口、原纸供应、纸板纸箱制造和大型终端客户四个节点上。
更值得产业界研究的是，这些节点并不是单向链条。包装工厂服务消费电子、家电、食品、化工、轻工和电商快递客户；终端客户产生的可回收纸又可以反向连接回收纤维采购；七大原纸基地分别靠近消费、制造和废纸产生区域；数字系统继续把采购、质检、排产、仓储和毛利测算连接起来。山鹰真正试图经营的，是“回收—造纸—包装—回收”的闭环。
但网络规模并没有自动变成强利润。2025年公司归母净利润亏损11.36亿元，造纸业务毛利率仅3.22%；2026年第一季度归母净利润亏损4.97亿元，据报表计算的综合毛利率约2.46%。如果只看利润结果，容易把问题理解成“规模失效”；如果把销量、吨纸价差、供应商账期、新产能折旧和可转债兑付放在一起，结论会更准确：基本盘仍在运转，压力集中发生在单位产品创造的毛利和资金成本上。
这一区分很重要。2025年原纸销量仍增长2.25%，原纸和包装产销率分别达到99.21%和99.96%；2026年半年度业绩预告也称原纸产销量同比增长。与此同时，2026年二季度预计归母亏损较一季度收窄63.18%，6月实现单月盈利。它说明亏损并非由销售网络失速单一造成，修复变量已经可以识别；但半年报预告仍属未经审计的初步测算，尚不能据此宣布全面反转。
因此，本文不做“企业规模介绍”，也不把网络优势写成确定性盈利。真正值得回答的问题是：山鹰的循环网络究竟控制了哪些产业变量？为什么这张网络暂时没有形成与规模相匹配的回报？2026年开始的战略转型，又要通过哪些指标才能被证明有效？
FOUR NUMBERS · 四个关键数字
748.60万吨 2025年原纸销量 | 20.97亿平方米 2025年包装销量 |
33.81亿元 2025年经营活动现金流净额 | －11.36亿元 2025年归母净利润 |
口径说明：以上均为2025年年度报告数据。公司所称“千万吨落地产能”和行业位次属于企业披露口径；设计或落地产能不等于实际产量、有效产能或盈利产能。
EVIDENCE LEVEL · 先分清三类证据
已实现结果：2025年经营、财务、产销量与分业务毛利率，来自经审计年度报告。
初步经营信号：2026年一季度报告未经审计；半年度业绩预告为财务部门初步测算，正式半年报尚未披露。
战略及项目线索：“7030”、化学浆项目、京东工业合作均需等待建设、运营与财务结果验证，不计作已实现收益。
LOSS BRIDGE · 先把亏损讲透
亏损的本质：不是货卖不出去，
而是每吨产品贡献不足
先排除一个常见误读：2025年原纸销量和产销率并未失守。真正击中利润表的是吨纸价差。公司监管问询回复披露，全国废纸采购均价同比上涨9.28%，公司原纸销售均价却下降1.63%，造纸业务毛利率由上年进一步降至3.22%；按公司回复的影响测算，主营产品毛利变动解释了当期净利润变动的56.98%。因此，这更接近“毛利问题”，而不是“销量问题”。
其中还包含一次有明确目的的经营调整。为应对“鹰19转债”兑付和集中资本支出，公司表示曾给予部分上游供应商采购价格优惠，以换取付款期限延长；正常月结30至90天的账期，通过供应链融资主要可延长至6至12个月。采购端因此让出部分毛利；从现金流量表补充资料看，经营性应付项目增加对2025年经营现金流形成22.07亿元正向调节，帮助公司取得33.81亿元经营活动现金流净额。需要强调，22.07亿元是全部经营性应付项目的调节额，不能全部归因于供应链融资。这是一项“优先保流动性、阶段性牺牲毛利”的选择，不宜美化为利润，也不能误读为销售能力失效。
从经营压力到财务结果，证据链可以完整闭合：
外部价差：国废采购价上涨、原纸销售价下降，直接压缩吨纸毛利。
主动调整：以采购价格优惠换取更长账期，把一部分利润空间转换为流动性安全垫。
产能周期：吉林、宿州等新产能投产，销量增加的同时先承担折旧、爬坡与单位固定成本。
利润结果：原纸业务毛利率降至3.22%，叠加投资收益减少、资产及信用减值增加，最终形成年度亏损。
MARGINAL REPAIR · 已出现的边际变化
2026年一季度 －4.97亿元 | 2026年二季度 约－1.83亿元 | 2026年6月 单月盈利 |
注：二季度数据由半年度业绩预告与一季报推算，6月盈利亦来自业绩预告，均待正式半年报验证。
科学而积极的结论不是“已经反转”，而是：亏损来源可拆解，最大单项兑付事件已经解除，季度亏损正在收窄；接下来只要供应链信用折价回落、新产能利用效率提升、吨纸毛利恢复，利润表就具备较强的经营杠杆。但这条路径仍必须由正式毛利率、短债覆盖和自由现金流共同证明。
ONE SENTENCE · 一句话看懂山鹰
山鹰真正强的不是单台纸机，而是同时控制纤维入口、区域产能、包装客户触点、终端回收入口和产业数据；它当前要证明的，是这张网络能否从“保障规模与流动性”，升级为“持续创造利润与自由现金流”。
CORE JUDGMENT
先说结论：山鹰强在“循环网络控制力”
这张网络可以拆成六个相互咬合的控制面：
纤维入口：国内回收渠道、海外废纸贸易与再生浆共同形成原料接口
基地网络：七大造纸基地靠近制造、消费、废纸产生地与核心市场
包装触点：纸板纸箱工厂把原纸销售延伸为终端客户服务与需求感知
闭环回收：包装客户又能反向连接高质量回收纤维，降低供给不确定性
数字调度：质量、价格、订单、产能、库存和毛利被放进同一数据系统
资本与信用：账期、供应链融资和现金流成为网络运行的隐性基础设施
01 · FIBER ENTRY
第一层：废纸不是一种原料，而是一套采购与质量网络
再生包装纸的成本起点，不是废纸挂牌价，而是“合格纤维到机成本”。同样一吨回收纸，因为含水率、杂质率、纤维强度、分选纯度、运输距离和结算条件不同，实际可用纤维成本可能完全不同。大型企业真正需要管理的，是稳定数量、合格质量、到厂节奏和资金占用四个变量。
山鹰年报披露，重要造纸子公司约97%的原材料来自回收纤维；公司在国内外建立采购网络，并通过美国、英国、荷兰等地的回收纤维贸易以及东南亚再生浆基地补充原料路径。海外贸易的价值不能简单理解为“把海外废纸直接运进国内”——固体废物进口政策改变后，贸易、海外用料、再生浆加工和国内原料之间是不同合规路径，必须分别核算。
2025年18.16亿元再生纤维主营收入中，公司在年报问询回复里说明，93.44%来自总部位于荷兰的WPT，且该部分不涉及国内供应链融资。美国环宇则主要面向亚洲客户，其中集团内客户占比超过90%，更接近集团原料渠道。也就是说，山鹰的海外回收体系同时包含对外贸易与内部供应，两者的战略价值和利润口径并不相同。
专业判断
回收网络的护城河，不是“采购点越多越好”，而是单位合格纤维成本、直采比例、散货回收能力、质量可追溯性和到厂稳定性同时改善。山鹰2026年提出减少调货业务、提高分拣中心散货采购比例，说明网络正在从规模覆盖转向采购效率。
02 · NETWORK GEOMETRY
第二层：七大基地的本质，是重构供需半径
包装原纸单位价值相对有限、运输量大，对物流半径高度敏感。基地离废纸产生地更近，可以降低原料集运成本；离纸板纸箱工厂和终端制造业更近，可以缩短成品运输与交付周期。山鹰在马鞍山、嘉兴、漳州、荆州、肇庆、松原和宿州形成七大造纸基地，覆盖华东、华南、华中与东北。
公司年报称，其产能辐射19省1市、覆盖约占国内市场总量78%的区域。这一比例属于公司披露口径，但布局逻辑清楚：长三角兼具包装需求和废纸供给，闽粤连接出口制造业，华中承担区域枢纽，东北基地补足远距离市场。宿州一期90万吨包装纸产能在2025年投产，使国内布局基本完成，下一阶段重点已经从“有没有基地”转向“基地能否高负荷、低成本运行”。
基地网络还包含能源与环保基础设施。除广东基地依托园区集中供电外，公司披露其他国内造纸基地均设有自备电厂；马鞍山、海盐和荆州的工业可燃固废发电项目已投产。热、电、水、污泥和固废处理被放在基地层面统筹，能够降低单个纸机独立承担的基础设施成本。
基地越多，协同空间越大，调度复杂度也越高。真正有效的网络必须持续降低“废纸到厂公里数、原纸到包装厂公里数、订单交付时间和基地闲置成本”，而不是只增加地图上的产能点。
03 · CUSTOMER LOOP
第三层：20亿平方米包装，把吨纸生意变成客户接口
原纸企业通常知道市场价格，却未必直接知道品牌客户为什么改箱型、减克重、换印刷、调整交货批次。包装工厂更靠近应用端，能够更早感知消费电子、家电、食品、电商和工业品客户的订单结构、质量投诉、促销节奏与出海需求。
山鹰的包装板块覆盖江苏、浙江、安徽、福建、广东、湖北、山东、四川、天津和贵州等区域，并在越南、泰国布局二级厂；产品包括水印、预印、胶印和数码印刷纸箱，以及工业纸塑、食品纸塑。青岛、苏州、嘉兴、珠海和台北五个独立研发测试中心，则面向3C包装和创新物流包装开展设计。
更关键的是反向闭环。公司披露，包装板块下游客户可以与回收纤维采购连接，通过终端合作获取质量更稳定的回收纤维。于是，一张纸箱完成交付后并没有离开系统：客户订单形成包装需求，使用后的纸包装又可能成为上游原料，原纸、纸箱与回收不再是三段孤立交易。
包装板块为什么重要？
2025年造纸业务毛利率为3.22%，纸制品毛利率为12.20%。两者产品、资本强度和会计结构不同，不能直接做简单优劣比较；但数据至少说明，越靠近客户与解决方案，价值密度通常越高。山鹰2026年不再以包装营收快速扩张为主要目标，转向高回报订单与高附加值客户，正是在修复这条价值链。
04 · DIGITAL CONTROL
第四层：网络只有被数据调度，才可能成为效率
多基地、多纸种、多包装工厂并不天然产生协同。没有统一数据时，网络反而容易形成重复库存、低效调拨、订单错配和价格失真。山鹰的数字化价值，恰恰在于把复杂网络变成可调度对象。
年报披露，公司通过高级计划与排产系统连接ERP和MES，实现多工厂、多产品、多约束排产；统一智能仓储平台与无人叉车协同；AI视觉和整车水分智能检测用于回收纤维质检；商业智能平台贯通采购、生产、客户和财务数据，并建立造纸毛利实时测算与预测机制。马鞍山祥恒智能调度排产系统入选工信部2025年数字化转型典型案例。
这里最有产业意义的，不是“用了AI”，而是数据是否真正改变决策：一批废纸的含水率能否影响采购结算，一张订单能否被分配给总成本最低的基地，原纸价格变化能否实时传导到纸箱报价，库存和运输能否按网络最优而不是单厂最优运行。
数字化不是独立护城河。只有当它持续降低采购偏差、排产损失、库存天数、质量索赔和单位物流成本时，才会从“系统上线”变成“利润上线”。
05 · NETWORK ECONOMICS
第五层：网络价值，最终必须落到一张经济账
循环网络很容易在叙事上成立，却很难在财务上成立。回收点、纸机、包装厂和终端客户连接得更多，只说明企业拥有更多节点；这些节点是否创造价值，要看采购、制造、物流、产品和资金五个结果能否同时改善。
循环网络价值公式
网络价值＝合格纤维采购优势＋运输半径节约＋产能利用收益＋包装附加值＋营运资金效率－跨区域协同成本－信用成本－折旧与资本占用。
2025年公司实现33.81亿元经营活动现金流净额，显著好于归母净利润亏损11.36亿元。但现金流量表补充资料显示，经营性应付项目增加带来22.07亿元正向影响；存货增加和经营性应收项目增加则分别形成4.61亿元、1.64亿元资金占用。这意味着现金流韧性真实存在，同时也明显借助了供应商账期和经营性负债。
年报问询回复进一步把信用层打开：多数供应商正常账期为月结30至90天，供应链融资可将公司付款期限延长到主要6至12个月。公司披露2025年由其承担的供应商融资利息为1627.50万元，占财务费用1.79%；流动比率为0.43，剔除供应链融资后为0.45。年审会计师根据核查认为相关业务具有商业实质、会计处理符合准则。这里应理解为公司回复与审计核查结论，而不是忽略流动性约束的理由。
截至2026年3月末，公司流动资产121.60亿元、流动负债289.99亿元，流动比率约0.42；资产负债率约70.92%。账面货币资金47.93亿元也不能全部理解为可自由动用现金，因为2025年末货币资金增长的主要原因就是保证金增加。
对山鹰最专业的评价，不是“现金流好”或“负债高”二选一，而是：这张网络具备较强现金组织能力，但自由现金流、短债覆盖、供应商账期和资本回报仍需同时修复。
06 · PROFIT CONVERSION
第六层：亏损是一场“利润错配”，
修复条件正在形成
第一重错配，是原料上涨与成品降价叠加。公司在问询回复中披露，2025年国废采购均价1733.08元／吨，同比增长9.28%；原纸销售均价2926.88元／吨，同比下降1.63%。行业供需压低成品价格，是被动压力；为保证可转债兑付与现金储备而给予部分供应商采购价格优惠、换取账期延长，则是主动选择。两股力量同时作用于采购与销售两端，使吨纸毛利比销量更早承压。
第二重错配，是新增产量与固定成本释放不同步。吉林和宿州项目在2024至2025年逐步投产，瓦楞纸产销量增长，但新产能需要经历设备磨合、产品认证、订单爬坡和效率提升。2025年现金流量表补充资料列示固定资产折旧等17.69亿元。规模只有在较高利用率、稳定良率和合理售价同时成立时才会摊薄单位成本；在爬坡初期，折旧和运维费用往往先进入利润表。
第三，网络中的高价值环节还不够大。2025年造纸主营收入195.66亿元、毛利率3.22%；纸制品主营收入67.29亿元、毛利率12.20%。包装更靠近客户、毛利率更高，但收入规模远小于原纸。山鹰必须让高回报订单、设计服务、轻量化和功能化包装占比持续提高，才能改变整体利润结构。
第四，海外资产仍在拖累。2025年境外主营收入34.28亿元，综合毛利率为－0.33%；其中再生纤维与纸制品毛利率分别为8.41%和15.16%，主要拖累来自凤凰纸业，毛利率为－14.91%。公司回复称，凤凰纸业受售价下降、产能未完全释放、设备恢复与市场重建影响。可见“全球网络”内部并非所有节点都创造正贡献。
这四类压力的性质并不相同。行业价差与信用折价具有周期性和阶段性，债务高峰解除后存在修复空间；新增产能的固定成本可以通过利用率和良率提升被摊薄；包装业务占比提升属于更慢的结构性工程；凤凰纸业则需要独立的产品、市场与资产效率改善。把它们全部归为“行业不好”会失真，把它们全部归为“永久损失”同样不科学。
真正的分水岭，是修复顺序
先解除集中兑付压力，再减少为换取账期付出的信用折价；随后用产能利用率和产品结构修复吨纸毛利，最终把经营现金流转化为自由现金流。只有这条顺序走通，山鹰的大网络才会从“现金组织能力”升级为“稳定回报能力”。
REPAIR EVIDENCE · 修复证据链
五个可以量化的积极信号，
以及各自的验证边界
01｜核心经营网络没有失速
2025年原纸销量增长2.25%，产销率99.21%；包装产销率99.96%。这说明渠道、客户和交付体系仍具韧性。边界在于：高产销率只证明产品能够被市场吸收，不等于售价和单位利润已经恢复。
02｜最大的集中兑付事件已经跨过
2025年内“鹰19转债”约18.28亿元完成转股，剩余约0.16亿元本金完成赎回并摘牌；一年内到期的非流动负债由57.66亿元降至21.33亿元，下降约63%。这为减少“以毛利换账期”创造了条件，但短期借款和流动比率仍需继续改善。
03｜资金使用正在从扩张转向约束
2025年财务费用降至9.11亿元，同比下降12.70%；2026年一季度购建固定资产、无形资产和其他长期资产支付现金1.34亿元，较上年同期7.99亿元明显减少。它与公司“严控资本及费用支出”的方向一致，但单季度资本开支会受项目付款节奏影响，不能仅凭一个季度判断长期强度。
04｜存量产能开始转向效率经营
公司在2026年5月业绩说明会问答中称，当前产能利用率处于90%至95%，并提出优化、升级或处置低效固定资产。这个时点口径说明核心产能仍有较强运行基础；但它不是经审计的全年平均利用率，最终还要看单位成本、检修损失和分基地盈利。
05｜利润端已出现连续收敛信号
半年度业绩预告显示，二季度归母亏损约1.83亿元，较一季度减少约3.14亿元、收窄63.18%，6月实现单月盈利。这是目前最直接的边际修复证据；但单月盈利可能受纸价、成本、检修和非经常因素影响，仍需正式半年报给出毛利率与现金流桥接。
因此，正面判断有充分依据，但必须准确表述为“修复条件正在形成、早期信号已经出现”。检验真正反转的三个硬指标仍是：造纸毛利率连续回升、经营现金流不再主要依赖应付项目增加、扣除资本开支后的自由现金流转正。
2026 CHANGE SIGNALS
六条最新线索，正在改写这张网络
2026年4月｜“7030”把经营目标从规模改成回报
公司新五年战略提出：造纸业务毛利水平跻身行业70分位，包装业务高回报订单每年增长30%；并将自由现金流纳入经营考核与决策核心指标。这是目标与管理框架，不是利润承诺，但方向已经从资产扩张转向流动性、利润和资产回报。
2026年一季度｜回款与投资约束先动，毛利随后验证
一季度收入62.15亿元，同比下降8.15%；归母净利润亏损4.97亿元，经营活动现金流净额4.52亿元、同比增长69.54%，销售商品、提供劳务收到的现金同比增长约7.68%。同期购建长期资产支付的现金由7.99亿元降至1.34亿元。回款与投资约束已有改善，但据报表计算的综合毛利率仍只有约2.46%，修复尚未完整传导到利润端。
2026年5月｜华中70.6万吨化学浆项目进入环评公示
公开环评摘要显示，项目拟分两期建设40万吨和30.6万吨漂白硫酸盐化学浆生产线，95%以上使用进口木片，产品拟以浆板形式外售。公司年报战略则强调在华中等基地建设木浆线、完善高端包装纸浆纸一体化。两种公开口径的侧重点并不完全相同，内部协同方式、资本开支和建设节奏应以正式审批、项目实施及后续公告为准。
2026年6月｜与京东工业连接回收、物流与包材需求
6月5日，双方签署战略合作协议。公开信息指向废纸回收体系、双向物流、AI生产管理、低碳与包装研发，并称山鹰成为京东工业包材品类首家指定合作工厂。这一合作与山鹰循环网络高度契合，但现阶段属于合作框架，不能提前推算采购量、订单或利润贡献。
2026年7月｜监管问询把网络信用层变得更透明
公司详细披露七类供应链融资产品、底层采购单据、货物流与资金流，以及账期和财务影响。年审会计师表示，经核查相关业务具有商业实质、会计处理符合准则。对产业研究而言，这次回复的意义在于：供应链金融不是外围工具，而是回收纤维网络如何稳定中小供应商、延长付款周期和保障流动性的组成部分。
2026年7月｜二季度减亏，但拐点仍待正式财报验证
半年度业绩预告预计归母净利润亏损6.80亿元、扣非归母净利润亏损7.30亿元；二季度归母亏损约1.83亿元，较一季度减少约3.14亿元、收窄63.18%，6月实现单月盈利。趋势已由“亏损扩大”转向“亏损收敛”，但正式半年报披露前，售价、吨纸毛利、工作资本和自由现金流的完整桥接仍不可见。
CONCLUSION
网络是能力，
回报才是证明
山鹰国际真正强的地方，是把造纸企业通常分散在外部的几个关键节点——回收纤维、区域纸机、包装加工、终端客户、回收入口、物流数据与供应链信用——逐步组织进同一张网络。
这张网络让企业拥有更大的采购覆盖、更短的供应半径、更直接的客户感知和更强的现金组织能力；但它也带来重资产、跨区域协同、海外运营、供应商账期和信用成本。2025年的亏损不是对网络价值的简单否定，而是一次清晰的压力测试：当行业价差收窄、集中兑付与新产能爬坡同时发生时，网络首先保住了产销与现金组织，利润则承担了调整成本。
积极的一面在于，这次压力测试已经暴露出具体改进顺序，而非留下一个模糊问题。可转债兑付高峰已经跨过，资本支出和财务费用出现收敛，二季度预计亏损显著缩小；如果供应链信用折价随流动性改善而回落，新产能效率继续提升，高回报包装订单逐步扩大，山鹰的利润弹性就可能比收入弹性更快释放。
接下来判断山鹰是否真正完成转型，应重点看六个可验证指标：
造纸毛利率能否从3.22%的低位持续修复，并接近“行业70分位”？
高回报包装订单能否按年增长30%，并转化为分部利润和客户结构改善？
国废直采、散货采购与质量数据能否真正降低合格纤维到机成本？
新基地能否完成产能爬坡，让销量增长快于折旧与单位固定成本增长？
经营现金流能否减少对应付项目增长与账期延长的依赖，转化为自由现金流？
凤凰纸业与其他海外节点能否从战略覆盖转为稳定的正毛利和资本回报？
山鹰已经把产业链连接起来；它下一阶段最重要的任务，是把每一次连接都变成更低的单位成本、更高的订单价值和更可靠的自由现金流。
NEXT ISSUE · 系列预告
下一篇：博汇纸业为什么强？它把大型纸机变成了产品平台
“中国纸业强企样本研究”不做简单企业介绍，持续拆解头部纸企的资源、成本、产品、管理与产业链能力。
博碳包装·产业洞察·研究说明
山鹰国际《2025年年度报告》：公告原文镜像
山鹰国际《2026年第一季度报告》：公告原文镜像
山鹰国际《2026年半年度业绩预告》：上海证券交易所披露原文
山鹰国际2025年年度报告监管问询回复：上海证券交易所披露原文
山鹰国际2025年度暨2026年一季度业绩说明会问答摘要：中国纸业网公开信息
山鹰华中70.6万吨化学浆项目环评信息：公开环评摘要
山鹰国际与京东工业战略合作：中国造纸杂志社信息
本文为产业研究与一般性信息，不构成投资、商业或法律意见。本文对企业战略、竞争力和产业机会的分析包含基于公开资料的专业判断，不代表企业官方表述，也不意味着任何合作或产品采用关系。2025年数据来自经审计年报；2026年第一季度报告未经审计；2026年半年度业绩预告为初步测算，不能替代正式半年报。公司业绩说明会所述90%至95%产能利用率属于时点经营口径，不等于经审计的全年平均利用率。设计产能、企业排名、战略目标、合作协议、备案与环境评价，不等于实际产量、行业权威排名、锁定订单、建成投产或商业回报。供应链融资相关事实及合规性结论采用公司问询回复与年审会计师核查口径。企业应结合交易所正式公告、项目批复、实际运营和具体应用要求进一步核验。信息核验截至2026年8月9日。
CHINA PAPER LEADERS · NO.04
Why Is Shanying International Strong?
What It Really Operates Is a Circular Network
Looking Beyond the Losses to See How Recovered Fiber, Seven Major Production Bases, 2 Billion Square Meters of Packaging, and End Customers Are Connected—and Why Profits Are Under Pressure, What Adjustments Have Already Occurred, and What Still Needs to Be Verified in the Recovery
A truly valuable circular network is not created by simply placing “recycling, papermaking, and packaging” side by side in an organizational structure. It is created by channeling recovered fiber generated by end customers back into the base-paper system, enabling base-paper mills and packaging plants to share order, pricing, quality, and inventory data, and jointly optimizing logistics, energy, and working-capital turnover.
Scale is the most visible aspect of Shanying International. According to the company’s 2025 annual report, its seven domestic papermaking bases have installed capacity totaling 10 million metric tons, while its packaging segment produces more than 2 billion square meters annually; base-paper sales volume reached 7.4860 million metric tons and packaging sales volume reached 2.097 billion square meters. This scale is certainly important, but explaining Shanying only through capacity and sales would miss the part that is harder to replicate: it simultaneously occupies four nodes—recovered-paper sourcing, base-paper supply, corrugated board and box manufacturing, and major end customers.
More worthy of industry attention is that these nodes do not form a one-way chain. Packaging plants serve customers in consumer electronics, home appliances, food, chemicals, light industry, and e-commerce and express delivery; recyclable paper generated by end customers can flow back into recovered-fiber procurement; the seven base-paper production bases are respectively located near consumption, manufacturing, and recovered-paper generation regions; and digital systems further connect procurement, quality inspection, production scheduling, warehousing, and gross-profit calculations. What Shanying is truly attempting to operate is a closed loop of “recycling–papermaking–packaging–recycling.”
But network scale has not automatically translated into strong profits. In 2025, the company recorded a loss of RMB 1.136 billion in net profit attributable to shareholders of the parent, while the papermaking business had a gross margin of only 3.22%; in the first quarter of 2026, net profit attributable to shareholders of the parent was a loss of RMB 497 million, and the overall gross margin calculated from the financial statements was approximately 2.46%. Looking only at the profit result can make the issue appear to be “scale failure”; considering sales volume, the spread per metric ton of paper, supplier payment terms, depreciation on new capacity, and convertible-bond redemption together leads to a more accurate conclusion: the core business remains operational, while pressure is concentrated in gross profit generated per unit of product and funding costs.
This distinction matters. Base-paper sales volume still increased 2.25% in 2025, while the sales-to-output ratios for base paper and packaging reached 99.21% and 99.96%, respectively; the preliminary 2026 interim earnings forecast also stated that base-paper production and sales volumes increased year over year. Meanwhile, the net loss attributable to shareholders of the parent for the second quarter of 2026 is estimated to have narrowed by 63.18% from the first quarter, and the company achieved a monthly profit in June. This indicates that the losses were not caused solely by a slowdown in the sales network and that recovery variables can already be identified; however, the interim earnings forecast remains an unaudited preliminary estimate and cannot yet support a declaration of a full turnaround.
Therefore, this article is not a “company scale overview,” nor does it portray network advantages as certain profitability. The questions worth answering are: Which industrial variables does Shanying’s circular network actually control? Why has this network temporarily failed to generate returns commensurate with its scale? And which indicators must validate the strategic transformation that began in 2026?
FOUR NUMBERS · Four Key Figures
7.4860 Million Metric Tons 2025 Base-Paper Sales Volume | 2.097 Billion Square Meters 2025 Packaging Sales Volume |
RMB 3.381 Billion 2025 Net Cash Flow from Operating Activities | –RMB 1.136 Billion 2025 Net Profit Attributable to Shareholders of the Parent |
Scope note: All figures above are from the 2025 annual report. The company’s references to “10 million metric tons of installed capacity” and its industry ranking are based on company disclosures; designed or installed capacity does not equal actual output, effective capacity, or profitable capacity.
EVIDENCE LEVEL · First Distinguish Three Types of Evidence
Realized results:2025 operating, financial, production and sales volume, and segment gross-margin data are from the audited annual report.
Preliminary operating signals:The first-quarter 2026 report is unaudited; the interim earnings forecast is a preliminary estimate by the finance department, and the formal interim report has not yet been disclosed.
Strategic and project signals:“7030,” the chemical pulp project, and cooperation with JD Industrials all require validation through construction, operations, and financial results and are not counted as realized earnings.
LOSS BRIDGE · First Understand the Losses
The Essence of the Losses: It Is Not That Products Cannot Be Sold,
but That Contribution per Metric Ton Is Insufficient
First, rule out a common misreading: base-paper sales volume and the sales-to-output ratio did not break down in 2025. What actually hit the income statement was the spread per metric ton of paper. In its response to the regulatory inquiry, the company disclosed that the nationwide average purchase price of recovered paper rose 9.28% year over year, while the company’s average base-paper selling price declined 1.63%, pushing the papermaking business gross margin further down to 3.22%; according to the impact calculation in the company’s response, changes in gross profit from principal products explained 56.98% of the change in net profit for the period. This is therefore closer to a “gross-margin problem” than a “sales-volume problem.”
This also included an operating adjustment made for a clearly stated purpose. To address redemption of the “Shanying 19 Convertible Bonds” and concentrated capital expenditures, the company stated that it offered purchase-price concessions to certain upstream suppliers in exchange for extended payment terms; normal monthly settlement terms of 30 to 90 days could mainly be extended to 6 to 12 months through supply-chain financing. The procurement side therefore gave up part of its gross margin; according to the supplementary information to the cash flow statement, increases in operating payables provided a positive RMB 2.207 billion adjustment to 2025 operating cash flow, helping the company generate RMB 3.381 billion in net cash flow from operating activities. It should be emphasized that the RMB 2.207 billion is the adjustment from all operating payables and cannot be attributed entirely to supply-chain financing. This was a choice to “prioritize liquidity protection while sacrificing gross margin temporarily”; it should not be embellished as profit, nor misread as a failure of sales capability.
From operating pressure to financial results, the evidence chain can be fully closed:
External spread:Higher domestic recovered paper purchase prices and lower base-paper selling prices directly compressed gross profit per metric ton of paper.
Active adjustment:Purchase-price concessions were exchanged for longer payment terms, converting part of the profit margin into a liquidity buffer.
Capacity cycle:New capacity in Jilin, Suzhou, Anhui, and other locations came onstream, increasing sales volume while initially absorbing depreciation, ramp-up costs, and unit fixed costs.
Profit result:The base-paper business gross margin fell to 3.22%; combined with lower investment income and higher asset and credit impairment losses, this ultimately resulted in an annual loss.
MARGINAL REPAIR · Marginal Changes Already Visible
First Quarter 2026 –RMB 497 Million | Second Quarter 2026 Approximately –RMB 183 Million | June 2026 Monthly Profit |
Note: Second-quarter data are derived from the interim earnings forecast and first-quarter report; June profitability also comes from the earnings forecast. All remain subject to verification in the formal interim report.
A rigorous yet constructive conclusion is not “the company has already turned around,” but rather: the sources of the losses can be decomposed, the largest single concentrated redemption event has been resolved, and quarterly losses are narrowing; if supply-chain credit discounts decline, utilization efficiency of new capacity improves, and gross profit per metric ton of paper recovers, the income statement has substantial operating leverage. However, this pathway must still be demonstrated jointly by formal gross-margin data, short-term debt coverage, and free cash flow.
ONE SENTENCE · Shanying in One Sentence
Shanying’s real strength is not any single paper machine, but its simultaneous control of fiber entry points, regional capacity, packaging customer touchpoints, end-market recycling entry points, and industrial data; what it must now prove is whether this network can evolve from “supporting scale and liquidity” into “consistently generating profits and free cash flow.”
CORE JUDGMENT
Bottom Line First: Shanying Is Strong in “Circular-Network Control”
This network can be broken down into six interlocking control surfaces:
Fiber entry: domestic collection channels, overseas recovered-paper trading, and recycled pulp jointly form the raw-material interface
Production-base network: seven papermaking bases are located near manufacturing, consumption, recovered-paper generation areas, and core markets
Packaging touchpoints: corrugated board and box plants extend base-paper sales into end-customer service and demand sensing
Closed-loop recovery: packaging customers can in turn connect to high-quality recovered fiber, reducing supply uncertainty
Digital scheduling: quality, price, orders, capacity, inventory, and gross profit are integrated into the same data system
Capital and credit: payment terms, supply-chain financing, and cash flow serve as hidden infrastructure for network operations
01 · FIBER ENTRY
Layer One: Recovered Paper Is Not a Single Raw Material, but a Procurement and Quality Network
The cost starting point for recycled packaging paper is not the quoted price of recovered paper, but the “delivered-to-machine cost of qualified fiber.” For the same metric ton of recovered paper, differences in moisture content, contamination rate, fiber strength, sorting purity, transportation distance, and settlement terms can produce completely different costs for usable fiber. What a large enterprise truly needs to manage are four variables: stable volume, qualified quality, delivery cadence, and capital tied up.
Shanying’s annual report discloses that approximately 97% of the raw materials used by its major papermaking subsidiaries come from recovered fiber; the company has established procurement networks domestically and overseas and supplements its raw-material pathways through recovered-fiber trading in the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and other locations, as well as recycled-pulp bases in Southeast Asia. The value of overseas trading cannot simply be understood as “shipping overseas recovered paper directly into China”—following changes in solid-waste import policies, trading, overseas material use, recycled-pulp processing, and domestic raw materials are distinct compliance pathways and must be accounted for separately.
Of the RMB 1.816 billion in principal-business revenue from recovered fiber in 2025, the company explained in its response to the annual-report inquiry that 93.44% came from WPT, headquartered in the Netherlands, and that this portion did not involve domestic supply-chain financing. U.S.-based Cycle Link primarily serves Asian customers, with group-affiliated customers accounting for more than 90%, making it closer to a group raw-material channel. In other words, Shanying’s overseas recovery system includes both external trading and internal supply, and the strategic value and profit reporting of the two are not the same.
Professional Assessment
The moat of a recovery network is not “the more procurement points, the better,” but simultaneous improvement in the unit cost of qualified fiber, direct-procurement ratio, loose recovered-paper collection capability, quality traceability, and delivery stability. Shanying’s 2026 plan to reduce transfer-trading business and increase the share of loose-material procurement at sorting centers indicates that the network is shifting from scale coverage toward procurement efficiency.
02 · NETWORK GEOMETRY
Layer Two: The Essence of Seven Production Bases Is to Reshape Supply-and-Demand Radius
Packaging base paper has relatively limited unit value and high transportation volume, making it highly sensitive to logistics radius. Locating bases closer to recovered-paper generation areas can reduce raw-material collection and transportation costs; locating them closer to corrugated board and box plants and end-market manufacturing can shorten finished-product transportation and delivery cycles. Shanying has established seven papermaking bases in Ma’anshan, Jiaxing, Zhangzhou, Jingzhou, Zhaoqing, Songyuan, and Suzhou, Anhui, covering East China, South China, Central China, and Northeast China.
According to the company’s annual report, its capacity serves 19 provinces and 1 municipality, covering regions that account for approximately 78% of the domestic market. This percentage is based on company disclosure, but the layout logic is clear: the Yangtze River Delta combines packaging demand and recovered-paper supply, Fujian and Guangdong connect to export-oriented manufacturing, Central China serves as a regional hub, and the Northeast base fills distant-market coverage. Phase I of the Suzhou, Anhui, base, with 900,000 metric tons of packaging-paper capacity, commenced production in 2025, largely completing the domestic footprint. The next stage has already shifted from “whether a base exists” to “whether each base can operate at high load and low cost.”
The production-base network also includes energy and environmental infrastructure. Except for the Guangdong base, which relies on centralized power supply from the industrial park, the company discloses that all other domestic papermaking bases have captive power plants; industrial combustible-solid-waste power-generation projects in Ma’anshan, Haiyan, and Jingzhou have commenced operation. Coordinating heat, electricity, water, sludge, and solid-waste treatment at the base level can reduce infrastructure costs otherwise borne independently by individual paper machines.
The more production bases there are, the greater the potential for synergy—and the greater the scheduling complexity. A truly effective network must continuously reduce “kilometers from recovered paper to mill, kilometers from base paper to packaging plant, order lead time, and idle-capacity cost,” rather than merely adding capacity points on a map.
03 · CUSTOMER LOOP
Layer Three: 2 Billion Square Meters of Packaging Turns the Per-Ton Paper Business into a Customer Interface
Base-paper producers generally know market prices, but may not directly know why brand customers change box designs, reduce basis weight, change printing, or adjust delivery batches. Packaging plants are closer to applications and can detect earlier the order structures, quality complaints, promotion cycles, and overseas-expansion needs of customers in consumer electronics, home appliances, food, e-commerce, and industrial products.
Shanying’s packaging segment covers Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Guangdong, Hubei, Shandong, Sichuan, Tianjin, Guizhou, and other regions, with secondary plants in Vietnam and Thailand; products include flexographically printed, preprinted, offset-printed, and digitally printed corrugated boxes, as well as industrial molded-fiber packaging and food molded-fiber packaging. Five independent R&D and testing centers in Qingdao, Suzhou, Jiangsu, Jiaxing, Zhuhai, and Taipei focus on design for 3C packaging and innovative logistics packaging.
More important is the reverse closed loop. The company discloses that downstream customers of the packaging segment can be connected with recovered-fiber procurement, enabling access to more consistent-quality recovered fiber through end-customer cooperation. Thus, a corrugated box does not leave the system after delivery: customer orders create packaging demand, and used paper packaging can become upstream raw material again, meaning base paper, corrugated boxes, and recycling are no longer three isolated transactions.
Why Does the Packaging Segment Matter?
In 2025, the papermaking business had a gross margin of 3.22%, while paper products had a gross margin of 12.20%. The two differ in products, capital intensity, and accounting structure and therefore cannot be compared simplistically as better or worse; however, the data at least indicate that value density is generally higher closer to customers and solutions. In 2026, Shanying is no longer making rapid packaging-revenue expansion its primary objective and is instead shifting toward high-return orders and high-value-added customers, precisely to repair this part of the value chain.
04 · DIGITAL CONTROL
Layer Four: A Network Can Become Efficient Only When It Is Scheduled by Data
Multiple production bases, paper grades, and packaging plants do not inherently create synergy. Without unified data, the network can instead generate duplicate inventory, inefficient transfers, order mismatches, and pricing distortions. The value of Shanying’s digitalization lies precisely in turning a complex network into something that can be scheduled.
According to the annual report, the company uses an advanced planning and scheduling system connected with ERP and MES to enable multi-plant, multi-product, multi-constraint scheduling; a unified intelligent warehousing platform works with autonomous forklifts; AI vision and intelligent whole-vehicle moisture detection are used for recovered-fiber quality inspection; and a business-intelligence platform integrates procurement, production, customer, and financial data while establishing real-time calculation and forecasting mechanisms for papermaking gross profit. Ma’anshan Xiangheng’s intelligent scheduling and production-planning system was selected as a 2025 digital transformation exemplary case by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.
The most industrially meaningful point here is not that “AI is being used,” but whether data actually change decisions: can the moisture content of a batch of recovered paper affect procurement settlement; can an order be assigned to the production base with the lowest total cost; can changes in base-paper prices be transmitted in real time into corrugated-box quotations; and can inventory and transportation operate for network-wide optimization rather than single-mill optimization.
Digitalization is not an independent moat. Only when it continuously reduces procurement deviations, scheduling losses, inventory days, quality claims, and unit logistics costs does it move from “system go-live” to “profit go-live.”
05 · NETWORK ECONOMICS
Layer Five: Network Value Must Ultimately Be Reflected in an Economic Account
A circular network is easy to justify narratively but difficult to validate financially. Connecting more collection points, paper machines, packaging plants, and end customers only means that a company has more nodes; whether those nodes create value depends on whether procurement, manufacturing, logistics, products, and capital all improve simultaneously.
Circular-Network Value Formula
Network Value = Qualified-Fiber Procurement Advantage + Transportation-Radius Savings + Capacity-Utilization Benefit + Packaging Value Added + Working-Capital Efficiency – Cross-Regional Coordination Costs – Credit Costs – Depreciation and Capital Tied Up.
In 2025, the company generated RMB 3.381 billion in net cash flow from operating activities, significantly better than the RMB 1.136 billion loss in net profit attributable to shareholders of the parent. However, supplementary information to the cash flow statement shows that increases in operating payables contributed a positive RMB 2.207 billion, while increases in inventories and operating receivables tied up RMB 461 million and RMB 164 million, respectively. This means cash-flow resilience genuinely exists, while also relying materially on supplier payment terms and operating liabilities.
The annual-report inquiry response further opens up the credit layer: most suppliers normally have monthly settlement terms of 30 to 90 days, while supply-chain financing can mainly extend the company’s payment terms to 6 to 12 months. The company disclosed that supplier-financing interest borne by it in 2025 was RMB 16.2750 million, accounting for 1.79% of finance expenses; the current ratio was 0.43 and 0.45 excluding supply-chain financing. Based on its review, the annual auditor concluded that the relevant transactions had commercial substance and that the accounting treatment complied with applicable standards. This should be understood as the company’s response and the auditor’s review conclusion, not as a reason to disregard liquidity constraints.
As of the end of March 2026, the company had RMB 12.160 billion in current assets and RMB 28.999 billion in current liabilities, for a current ratio of approximately 0.42; the debt-to-asset ratio was approximately 70.92%. The RMB 4.793 billion in cash and cash equivalents on the balance sheet also cannot all be interpreted as freely available cash, because the main reason for the increase in monetary funds at year-end 2025 was an increase in deposits pledged as guarantees.
The most professional assessment of Shanying is not a binary choice between “strong cash flow” and “high debt,” but rather: this network has strong cash-organization capabilities, while free cash flow, short-term debt coverage, supplier payment terms, and returns on capital still need to improve together.
06 · PROFIT CONVERSION
Layer Six: The Losses Reflect a “Profit Mismatch,”
and the Conditions for Recovery Are Taking Shape
The first mismatch is the combination of higher raw-material costs and lower finished-product prices. In its inquiry response, the company disclosed that the average purchase price of domestic recovered paper in 2025 was RMB 1,733.08/metric ton, up 9.28% year over year, while the average base-paper selling price was RMB 2,926.88/metric ton, down 1.63% year over year. Industry supply and demand depressing finished-product prices was an external pressure; offering purchase-price concessions to certain suppliers in exchange for extended payment terms to secure convertible-bond redemption and cash reserves was an active choice. The two forces acted simultaneously on procurement and sales, causing gross profit per metric ton of paper to come under pressure before sales volume did.
The second mismatch is the timing difference between new output and the absorption of fixed costs. Projects in Jilin and Suzhou, Anhui, gradually commenced production in 2024–2025, increasing production and sales of corrugating medium, but new capacity must pass through equipment run-in, product qualification, order ramp-up, and efficiency improvement. Supplementary information to the 2025 cash flow statement lists RMB 1.769 billion in depreciation of fixed assets and related items. Scale reduces unit costs only when high utilization, stable yield, and reasonable selling prices are achieved simultaneously; during early ramp-up, depreciation and operating and maintenance expenses often enter the income statement first.
Third, the network’s high-value segments are still not large enough. In 2025, principal-business revenue from papermaking was RMB 19.566 billion with a gross margin of 3.22%, while principal-business revenue from paper products was RMB 6.729 billion with a gross margin of 12.20%. Packaging is closer to customers and has a higher gross margin, but its revenue scale is far smaller than base paper. Shanying must continuously increase the share of high-return orders, design services, lightweighting, and functional packaging to change the overall profit structure.
Fourth, overseas assets remain a drag. In 2025, overseas principal-business revenue was RMB 3.428 billion, with an overall gross margin of –0.33%; gross margins for recovered fiber and paper products were 8.41% and 15.16%, respectively, while the main drag was Phoenix Paper, with a gross margin of –14.91%. According to the company’s response, Phoenix Paper was affected by lower selling prices, capacity not yet fully released, equipment recovery, and market rebuilding. This shows that not every node within the “global network” makes a positive contribution.
These four types of pressure are not the same in nature. Industry spreads and credit discounts are cyclical and temporary, leaving room for recovery after the debt peak passes; fixed costs from new capacity can be diluted through higher utilization and yield; increasing the share of packaging is a slower structural project; and Phoenix Paper requires separate improvements in products, markets, and asset efficiency. It would be inaccurate to classify all of them as “a weak industry,” and equally unscientific to classify all of them as “permanent losses.”
The Real Dividing Line Is the Sequence of Recovery
First resolve concentrated redemption pressure, then reduce the credit discounts paid in exchange for longer payment terms; next, restore gross profit per metric ton of paper through capacity utilization and product mix; and ultimately convert net cash flow from operating activities into free cash flow. Only if this sequence is completed can Shanying’s large network evolve from “cash-organization capability” into “stable-return capability.”
REPAIR EVIDENCE · Recovery Evidence Chain
Five Quantifiable Positive Signals,
and the Verification Boundary for Each
01 | The Core Operating Network Has Not Lost Momentum
In 2025, base-paper sales volume increased 2.25% and the sales-to-output ratio was 99.21%; the packaging sales-to-output ratio was 99.96%. This indicates that channels, customers, and delivery systems remain resilient. Boundary: a high sales-to-output ratio proves only that products can be absorbed by the market; it does not mean that selling prices and unit profits have recovered.
02 | The Largest Concentrated Redemption Event Has Been Passed
During 2025, approximately RMB 1.828 billion of the “Shanying 19 Convertible Bonds” was converted into shares, while the remaining approximately RMB 16 million in principal was redeemed and the bonds were delisted; non-current liabilities due within one year declined from RMB 5.766 billion to RMB 2.133 billion, a decrease of approximately 63%. This creates conditions for reducing the practice of “trading gross margin for payment terms,” but short-term borrowings and the current ratio still need further improvement.
03 | Capital Use Is Shifting from Expansion Toward Discipline
Finance expenses declined to RMB 911 million in 2025, down 12.70% year over year; in the first quarter of 2026, cash paid to acquire and construct fixed assets, intangible assets, and other long-term assets was RMB 134 million, significantly lower than RMB 799 million in the same period a year earlier. This is consistent with the company’s direction of “strictly controlling capital and expense expenditures,” but quarterly capital expenditure can be affected by project-payment timing, so long-term intensity cannot be judged from a single quarter alone.
04 | Existing Capacity Is Beginning to Shift Toward Efficiency-Oriented Operations
In Q&A at its May 2026 earnings briefing, the company stated that its current capacity utilization rate was 90% to 95% and that it planned to optimize, upgrade, or dispose of inefficient fixed assets. This point-in-time operating metric indicates that core capacity still has a strong operating foundation; however, it is not an audited full-year average utilization rate, and the ultimate assessment must still consider unit costs, maintenance losses, and profitability by production base.
05 | The Profit Side Has Shown Consecutive Signs of Convergence
The interim earnings forecast indicates that the second-quarter net loss attributable to shareholders of the parent was approximately RMB 183 million, about RMB 314 million lower than in the first quarter, narrowing by 63.18%, while June was profitable on a monthly basis. This is currently the most direct evidence of marginal recovery; however, monthly profitability may be affected by paper prices, costs, maintenance, and non-recurring factors, and the formal interim report is still needed to provide a bridge between gross margin and cash flow.
Therefore, there is sufficient basis for a positive assessment, but it must be stated accurately as “the conditions for recovery are taking shape and early signals have emerged.” The three hard indicators for verifying a genuine turnaround remain: sustained recovery in the papermaking gross margin, net cash flow from operating activities no longer relying primarily on increases in payables, and positive free cash flow after capital expenditures.
2026 CHANGE SIGNALS
Six Latest Signals Are Rewriting This Network
April 2026 | “7030” Shifts the Operating Objective from Scale to Returns
The company’s new five-year strategy proposes moving the papermaking business’s gross-margin level into the industry’s 70th percentile, increasing high-return packaging orders by 30% annually, and incorporating free cash flow as a core metric in operating assessment and decision-making. These are targets and a management framework, not profit commitments, but the direction has shifted from asset expansion toward liquidity, profit, and returns on assets.
First Quarter 2026 | Collections and Investment Discipline Improve First; Gross Margin Remains to Be Verified
First-quarter revenue was RMB 6.215 billion, down 8.15% year over year; net profit attributable to shareholders of the parent was a loss of RMB 497 million; net cash flow from operating activities was RMB 452 million, up 69.54% year over year; and cash received from sales of goods and rendering of services increased approximately 7.68% year over year. During the same period, cash paid to acquire and construct long-term assets declined from RMB 799 million to RMB 134 million. Collections and investment discipline have improved, but the overall gross margin calculated from the financial statements remained only approximately 2.46%, meaning the recovery has not yet fully transmitted to the profit side.
May 2026 | Central China 706,000-Metric-Ton Chemical Pulp Project Enters Environmental Impact Assessment Public-Notice Stage
The publicly available environmental impact assessment summary indicates that the project proposes two phases comprising bleached kraft chemical pulp production lines of 400,000 and 306,000 metric tons, with more than 95% imported wood chips, and that the products are planned to be sold externally in pulp-sheet form. The company’s annual-report strategy, meanwhile, emphasizes building wood-pulp lines at Central China and other bases and improving pulp-paper integration for high-end packaging paper. The emphasis of these two public disclosures is not entirely the same; internal synergies, capital expenditure, and construction timing should be subject to formal approvals, project implementation, and subsequent announcements.
June 2026 | Connecting Recycling, Logistics, and Packaging-Material Demand with JD Industrials
On June 5, the two parties signed a strategic cooperation agreement. Public information points to recovered-paper recycling systems, two-way logistics, AI production management, low-carbon initiatives, and packaging R&D, and states that Shanying became JD Industrials’ first designated partner factory in the packaging-material category. This cooperation is highly aligned with Shanying’s circular network, but at this stage it remains a cooperation framework and cannot be used to project procurement volumes, orders, or profit contributions in advance.
July 2026 | Regulatory Inquiry Makes the Network’s Credit Layer More Transparent
The company disclosed in detail seven categories of supply-chain financing products, underlying procurement documents, goods and fund flows, payment terms, and financial impacts. The annual auditor stated that, based on its review, the relevant transactions had commercial substance and the accounting treatment complied with applicable standards. For industrial analysis, the significance of this response is that supply-chain finance is not a peripheral tool, but part of how the recovered-fiber network stabilizes small and medium-sized suppliers, extends payment periods, and safeguards liquidity.
July 2026 | Second-Quarter Loss Narrows, but the Inflection Point Still Awaits Verification in Formal Financial Statements
The interim earnings forecast estimates a loss of RMB 680 million in net profit attributable to shareholders of the parent and a loss of RMB 730 million in net profit attributable to shareholders of the parent excluding non-recurring gains and losses; the second-quarter net loss attributable to shareholders of the parent was approximately RMB 183 million, about RMB 314 million lower than in the first quarter, narrowing by 63.18%, and June was profitable on a monthly basis. The trend has shifted from “widening losses” to “narrowing losses,” but before the formal interim report is disclosed, the complete bridge among selling prices, gross profit per metric ton of paper, working capital, and free cash flow remains unavailable.
CONCLUSION
The Network Is the Capability,
Returns Are the Proof
Shanying International’s true strength lies in progressively organizing within a single network several critical nodes that papermaking companies typically leave outside their boundaries—recovered fiber, regional paper machines, packaging converting, end customers, recycling entry points, logistics data, and supply-chain credit.
This network gives the company broader procurement coverage, shorter supply radii, more direct customer insight, and stronger cash-organization capabilities; but it also brings capital intensity, cross-regional coordination, overseas operations, supplier payment terms, and credit costs. The 2025 loss is not a simple negation of the network’s value, but a clear stress test: when industry spreads narrowed while concentrated redemption obligations and new-capacity ramp-up occurred simultaneously, the network first preserved production and sales and cash organization, while profits absorbed the adjustment costs.
The positive side is that this stress test has exposed a specific sequence for improvement rather than leaving a vague problem. The peak in convertible-bond redemption has passed, capital expenditures and finance expenses have begun to converge, and the second-quarter loss is estimated to have narrowed significantly; if supply-chain credit discounts decline as liquidity improves, new-capacity efficiency continues to rise, and high-return packaging orders gradually expand, Shanying’s profit elasticity may be released faster than its revenue elasticity.
Going forward, six verifiable indicators should be monitored to determine whether Shanying has truly completed its transformation:
Can the papermaking gross margin recover sustainably from the low level of 3.22% and approach the “industry’s 70th percentile”?
Can high-return packaging orders grow 30% annually and translate into improved segment profits and customer mix?
Can direct procurement of domestic recovered paper, loose-material procurement, and quality data genuinely reduce the delivered-to-machine cost of qualified fiber?
Can new production bases complete capacity ramp-up so that sales-volume growth outpaces growth in depreciation and unit fixed costs?
Can net cash flow from operating activities reduce its reliance on growth in payables and extended payment terms and convert into free cash flow?
Can Phoenix Paper and other overseas nodes move from strategic coverage to stable positive gross margins and returns on capital?
Shanying has connected the industrial chain; its most important task in the next stage is to turn every connection into lower unit costs, higher order value, and more reliable free cash flow.
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BIOTEN Packaging · Industry Insights · Research Notes
Shanying International “2025 Annual Report”: Mirror of Original Announcement
Shanying International “First Quarter 2026 Report”: Mirror of Original Announcement
Shanying International “2026 Interim Earnings Forecast”: Original Disclosure on the Shanghai Stock Exchange
Shanying International’s Response to the Regulatory Inquiry on Its 2025 Annual Report: Original Disclosure on the Shanghai Stock Exchange
Summary of Q&A from Shanying International’s 2025 Annual and First Quarter 2026 Earnings Briefing: Public Information from China Paper Network
Environmental Impact Assessment Information for Shanying’s Central China 706,000-Metric-Ton Chemical Pulp Project: Public Environmental Impact Assessment Summary
Strategic Cooperation Between Shanying International and JD Industrials: Information from China Paper Magazine
This article is provided for industry research and general informational purposes only and does not constitute investment, business, or legal advice. The analysis of corporate strategy, competitiveness, and industry opportunities contains professional judgments based on publicly available information, does not represent official statements by the company, and does not imply any cooperation or product-adoption relationship. 2025 data are from the audited annual report; the first-quarter 2026 report is unaudited; the 2026 interim earnings forecast is a preliminary estimate and cannot substitute for the formal interim report. The 90% to 95% capacity utilization rate stated at the company’s earnings briefing is a point-in-time operating metric and does not equal an audited full-year average utilization rate. Designed capacity, company rankings, strategic targets, cooperation agreements, filings, and environmental assessments do not equal actual output, authoritative industry rankings, secured orders, completed commissioning, or commercial returns. Facts and compliance conclusions related to supply-chain financing follow the company’s inquiry response and the annual auditor’s review. Companies should conduct further verification based on formal exchange announcements, project approvals, actual operations, and specific application requirements. Information verified through August 9, 2026.
